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Contracts to Promote Optimal Use of Optional Diagnostic Tests 
in Cancer Treatment 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we examine performance-based payment contracts to promote the optimal use of an 
optional diagnostic test for newly diagnosed cancer patients. Our work is inspired by three trends: 
tremendous increases in the cost of new, advanced cancer drugs; development of new diagnostic 
tests to allow physicians to tailor treatment to patients; and changes in healthcare funding models 
that reward quality care. We model the interaction between two parties—a healthcare payer and an 
oncologist, in which the oncologist has private information about patients’ characteristics (adverse 
selection) and the payer does not know whether the oncologist takes the optimal course of action 
(moral hazard). We show that, in the presence of information asymmetry, a healthcare payer should 
never incentivize an oncologist to use a diagnostic test for all patients, even if the diagnostic test is 
available for free. Moreover, although the oncologist has additional information about a patient’s 
risk, he cannot always benefit from this private information. We also find that social welfare may 
not increase as a result of a decrease in the oncologist’s concerns regarding the health outcome of 
patients. Finally, we show that it is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test 
compulsory even if such a policy can be implemented for free. 
Keywords: contract design; game theory; performance-based contracts; personalized medicine; 
quality of care 
Received: February 2016; accepted: August 2017 by Sergei Savin after three revisions. 
1. Introduction 
Cancer is the second leading cause of death in the United States, accounting for over 580,000 
deaths in 2013 (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013). The American Cancer Society 
estimates that there will be over 1,680,000 new cancer diagnoses in 2016 (American Cancer 
Society 2016). Cancer treatment typically consists of a combination of surgery, radiation 
therapy, hormone treatment, and chemotherapy. In recent years, cancer treatment costs have 
risen dramatically with the development of a number of biologics and targeted treatments. For 
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example, the cost of a course of therapy with trastuzumab (Herceptin) for breast cancer is 
estimated at $30,000 (Hornberger et al. 2005); the cost of a course of therapy with bevacizumab 
(Avastin) for colorectal cancer is approximately $90,000 (Picard 2012), and other drugs have 
been developed with a wide range of monthly costs per patient (Campbell 2015). 
In addition to growth in the number and cost of treatment options available, there has also 
been growth in the availability and use of personalized medicine, often implemented through 
genetic and gene-expression profiling tests, which can help guide cancer diagnosis and treatment 
decisions. In some jurisdictions, a KRAS test is required prior to treatment with cetuximab or 
panitimuab for colorectal cancer, based on evidence that these drugs are not effective in patients 
with mutations in the KRAS gene (Díaz-Rubio et al. 2012). The 21-gene assay for breast cancer 
(Oncotype Dx) generates a recurrence score based on the expression of 21 genes. The score is 
interpreted as the probability of cancer recurrence within 10 years and is used to guide adjuvant 
chemotherapy treatment decisions. In particular, women with a high recurrence score are advised 
to undergo adjuvant chemotherapy, whereas women with a low recurrence score may avoid 
adjuvant chemotherapy as it provides limited benefits but is associated with harmful side effects. 
A gene expression profiling test for cancer of unknown primary (the Tissue of Origin test) 
examines the expression of more than 2,000 genes and produces a set of 15 “similarity scores” 
that are interpreted as the probability that the tumor is one of 15 common types. This test can 
help to guide treatment decisions by directing treatment towards the most appropriate agents for 
a given type of cancer instead of using a general, non-specific treatment regimen. These 
diagnostic tests are an important element of personalized medicine since individualized treatment 
cannot be prescribed in the absence of this type of information.  
4 
 
 
The costs of these tests vary from less than $500 for single-gene tests like KRAS (Behl et 
al. 2012) to $4,000 or more for multi-gene tests (e.g., Oncotype Dx costs $4,175 (Ray 2011) and 
Tissue of Origin costs $3,750 (Tansey 2008)). Use of many of these tests is supported by clinical 
guidelines (Allegra et al. 2009, Carlson and Roth 2013) and a number of health technology 
assessments (e.g., Hannouf et al. 2012, Nerurkar et al. 2014, Hannouf et al. 2016). However, the 
uptake of these advanced tests is low despite evidence of benefits. For example, Segurado (2016) 
writes “despite solid scientific evidence and endorsement by oncology societies for multi-gene 
tests supporting therapy decision-making in breast cancer, only a small percentage of women are 
able to safely skip chemotherapy through personalized medicine.” In the United States, 90 
percent of people have insurance plans that cover the Oncotype Dx test, yet only 27 percent of 
eligible cancer patients used the test in 2010 (Enewold 2015).  
To help manage chemotherapy costs and incentivize physicians to provide high-quality 
care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has developed a new funding 
model called the Oncology Care Model (OCM). The OCM payment scheme consists of a “target 
price” for a six-month episode of treatment that is based on the average treatment cost of patients 
with similar health conditions. Under OCM, providers receive payments based on a fee-for-
service (FFS) model where the providers are compensated based on the volume of services 
performed. At the end of each treatment episode the providers may receive reward payments, 
conditional on the patient’s health status, if the total cost of treatment is below the target price 
(CMS 2015). The OCM thus creates conflicting objectives in managing care: while the target 
price aims to limit the treatment cost, the reward payments give physicians the flexibility of 
choosing more expensive treatments if it is believed that they will have a positive impact on the 
patient’s health status.  
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The OCM is part of a more general type of payment reform that focuses on performance-
based bundled payments. For instance, CMS introduced a 5-year payment program in April 2016 
for lower extremity joint replacement called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement 
(CJR) Model. Under the CJR model, hospitals will be compensated based on a target price that 
aims to cover the total cost of an episode of treatment. Hospitals may also receive quality 
incentive payments based on the health outcome of patients. Recent studies suggest that there is 
growing interest in bundled payment models by healthcare payers (Japsen 2015, Whitman 2016). 
Bundled payment models accounted for 15 percent of insurers’ spending in 2014 (Evans 2014) 
and there is evidence that these payment models have resulted in positive outcomes (Korda and 
Eldridge 2011).  
In this paper, we develop a stylized physician compensation model inspired by the 
growing use of advanced diagnostic testing technologies in cancer care. Although diagnostic 
tests are not explicitly included in OCM, the growing number of expensive testing technologies 
and the need to ensure the appropriate use of these tests suggests a need to include them in future 
funding models. Thus, our research explores what a bundled payment mechanism should look 
like if diagnostic tests are available. The central problem analyzed in this paper was identified in 
a report by consulting firm McKinsey and Co., which described one of the barriers to adopting 
new testing technologies for personalized medicine as “the difficulty of enforcing standard 
protocols to ensure that physicians follow through with appropriate patient care based on test 
results” (Davis et al. 2010). 
Our model involves interaction between a healthcare payer (payer) who pays for the test 
and advanced treatment (e.g., adjuvant chemotherapy), and an oncologist (provider) who makes 
decisions regarding the use of the test and the advanced treatment for patients. Patients are 
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heterogeneous, with different risks of cancer recurrence. Since the recurrence probability can 
only be known if the test is used, patients appear to be homogeneous members of different risk 
groups if the test is not used. The payer offers a payment contract to providers to maximize 
social welfare, defined as the monetary value of health outcomes minus the total costs of 
providing care. Depending on the payment structure offered by the payer, the provider chooses 
one of three treatment options: 1) Treat all patients with an advanced treatment without ordering 
the test; 2) Do not order the test and do not treat with an advanced treatment; or 3) Order the test 
and only treat those patients with advanced treatment whose recurrence probability is sufficiently 
high. While in the main analysis we assume that the provider decides whether to use the test or 
not, in some cases the test can be made compulsory (e.g., KRAS); therefore, in Section 6 we 
extend our analysis to the case where the test is compulsory for all patients. 
The contract design problem is complicated by information asymmetry in the system. 
First, there are many patient characteristics that are observed by physicians but are not formally 
recorded in any clinical or administrative databases held by the payer (adverse selection). 
Second, the payer also does not know which factors the physician considered when making the 
treatment decision, so the payer does not know whether the optimal course of action is used by 
the provider (moral hazard). To incentivize the provider to use the test whenever it is beneficial 
and to appropriately follow the recommendation of the test results whenever the test is used, the 
payer offers a menu of contracts consisting of a fixed payment per episode of treatment, and 
reward payments that are based on patients’ health and on whether or not advanced treatment is 
applied.  
The underlying problem has a structural novelty in that the provider’s decision to use an 
advanced treatment is conditional on his decision to order the diagnostic test. Therefore, finding 
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the optimal menu of contracts is a challenging problem as the constraints in the payer’s problem 
are not continuous. However, we construct the optimal menu of contracts by solving the payer’s 
problem for each treatment choice of the provider.  
Our paper yields several interesting findings that have policy implications. First, we show 
how the payer can design contracts such that the provider may not be able to take advantage of 
his private information. In this optimal contract structure, the payer should incorporate the 
provider’s treatment choices in the contracts. In particular, the payer should offer reward 
payments for not treating certain types of patients with an advanced treatment. This finding 
underlines empirical evidence on over-prescription of chemotherapy treatment (Smith and 
Hillner 2010) and suggests that “quality care” does not always depend on using the most 
expensive technology available. Furthermore, it shows that the advent of new diagnostic tests 
necessitates new reimbursement models because current payment models do not account for 
treatment choices made by the providers.  
Second, if the test is relatively inexpensive, then it may seem natural that the provider 
should order the diagnostic test for all patients. Interestingly, when the test is optional and there 
is imperfect information flow between the payer and the provider, we find that the payer should 
motivate the provider to only test certain types of patients, even if the diagnostic test can be 
available for free. This is because avoiding patient misrepresentation, when testing all patients, 
requires higher-valued contract payment terms compared to the case where the test is used for 
only one patient type. This is in agreement with empirical evidence showing that some new 
technologies might not be cost-effective even if they can be acquired for free (Davis 2014, Davis 
and Akehurst 2016). However, under complete information it is optimal to test all patients when 
the test cost is sufficiently low. This result highlights the importance of information flow in the 
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healthcare system and provides the first step in estimating the value gained by enhancing 
administrative databases held by the payer.  
Third, we find that a decrease in the reputational concerns and altruistic behaviour of a 
provider may not increase social welfare. This result is in line with the inconsistent evidence 
regarding the impact of malpractice pressure on healthcare systems (Avraham and Schanzenbach 
2010, Reyes 2010, Cotet 2012, Lakdawalla and Seabury 2012, Dai et al. 2016, Montanera 2016). 
Thus, we provide further support for Montanera (2016) who argues that tort reform, even if 
successful at reducing malpractice pressure, is not a ‘‘silver bullet’’ capable of achieving both 
cost reductions and quality improvements for all patients. 
Finally, we show that it is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test 
compulsory even if there is no cost to implement such a policy. While compulsory testing could 
eliminate adverse selection, it causes unnecessary testing of patients who are very likely to 
benefit (or not benefit) from an advanced treatment based on their pre-test evaluation. Thus, this 
finding suggests that even if a diagnostic test is recommended by clinical guidelines, it might be 
better to leave the decision about ordering the test to the judgment of physicians instead of 
making the test compulsory for the whole population. 
2. Literature Review 
Our study is primarily related to the stream of literature that considers design of mechanisms 
(e.g., performance-based payment models) for healthcare systems. For example, there are studies 
that design performance-based contracts to improve patient access to care (e.g., Jiang et al. 2012, 
Jiang et al. 2016, Savva et al. 2016). Jiang et al. (2012) consider contracts between a payer and a 
healthcare provider that serves a heterogeneous patient pool using an online appointment-
scheduling system. They propose a threshold penalty-payment scheme to reach a desired patient 
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waiting time (performance measure). Jiang et al. (2016) and Savva et al. (2016) study 
performance-based incentives when there is direct competition among providers. In these 
studies, performance measure is included in the proposed contracts. However, in our study, 
performance measure that is a patient’s health outcome is probabilistic and cannot be included as 
a contract term. Fuloria and Zenios (2001) also design performance-based contracts motivated by 
Medicare’s End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program, which was established in 1973 to provide 
affordable dialysis care for ESRD patients. They assume that all patients are homogeneous with 
the same probability function of experiencing complications or death after treatment. Our work 
differs in that we study heterogeneous patients that can only be sorted using a diagnostic test. 
Finally, Gupta and Mehrotra (2015) study the proposer selection problem of CMS for its 
“bundled payments for care improvement” initiative. Similar to our study, they find coordinating 
mechanisms to align the incentives of the payer and the provider. However, we focus on the 
heterogeneous patient pool visiting a provider that is already a participant of a payment program, 
while they focus on the provider competition and payer’s strategy to get optimal proposals from 
the providers. 
There are also studies in healthcare operations management that analyze a provider’s 
choice regarding use of diagnostic tests in various healthcare settings. Motivated by the 
utilization of cancer screening tests, Yaesoubi and Roberts (2011) study optimal reimbursement 
contracts between a payer and a healthcare provider. The provider is assumed to only care about 
the cost of treatment, and thus the health outcome of a patient does not affect the treatment 
choice of the provider. Conversely, we consider the case where the provider is concerned about 
patients’ health outcome. Moreover, we study the effects of an optional diagnostic test that can 
help the provider when deciding on treatment, whereas in Yaesoubi and Roberts (2011), the use 
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of a particular test is the provider’s only decision. Dai et al. (2016) study the effect of different 
service environments (e.g., provider’s misdiagnosis concern, reimbursement ceiling) on the 
provider’s test-ordering behaviour. Their study is focused on general diagnostic tests, such as 
MRI or EKG, that are used to identify whether a patient has a disease.  In contrast, we are 
interested in personalized medicine and diagnostic tests that identify if a patient (who is already 
diagnosed with a disease) can benefit from a targeted therapy. Similar to our approach to 
modeling the provider’s altruistic behaviour and reputational concerns when patients are not 
properly treated, Dai et al. (2016) explicitly modeled the provider’s misdiagnosis concern and 
show that both over-testing and under-testing are possible outcomes of these concerns. Finally, 
Dai et al. (2015) study the use of an optional test on decision-making of a provider regarding the 
use of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) for coronary artery disease. Similar to our 
approach they assume some degree of altruistic behaviour by providers and model it as a conflict 
of interest between financial gains and patients’ health outcome. They show that the 
incorporation of optional advanced testing into decision-making might have non-monotonic 
effects on the use of PCI depending on the amount of the provider’s conflict of interest. Unlike 
our study, they do not incorporate the payer’s incentives in use of the optional test and do not 
study the potential payment systems that might align the incentives of the payer and the provider.  
Adida et al. (2016) study the effects that FFS and bundled payment models have on 
patient selection and the treatment intensity decisions made by a provider. Similar to our model 
they consider a reputational penalty for the provider in case of a treatment failure. They find that 
the FFS model would result in overtreatment of patients. Guo et al. (2016) also compares the 
FFS model with a bundled payment model in a setting where patients are sensitive to waiting 
times. They show that when the patient pool is sufficiently small the bundled payment model 
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dominates the FFS model in all performance measures. Similar to our study they find optimal 
reimbursement policy of a payer who maximizes the patient welfare. Andritsos and Tang (2015) 
consider a co-managed situation where both the provider and the patient can exert effort to 
reduce the readmission rate. They show that bundled payment outperforms FFS by causing the 
provider and the patient to exert more effort to reduce readmission. These studies investigate 
incentive problems in healthcare systems in order to compare the outcome of different payment 
models, but they do not consider performance-based bundled payments. In this paper, we model 
newly proposed payment models that reward providers for higher quality of care and design 
performance-based payment contracts that align the incentives of the payer and the provider 
while achieving socially optimal treatment levels. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to study the use of performance-based contracts to coordinate the incentives of a healthcare payer 
and a provider while examining the impact of an optional diagnostic test on the provider’s 
decision-making process. 
3. The Model 
We consider a system that consists of a payer, a provider, and a pool of newly diagnosed patients 
who are eligible for an optional diagnostic test which shows the potential health benefits that a 
patient may receive from an advanced treatment option. We extend our analysis to a case where 
the diagnostic test is compulsory in Section 6. In this section, we consider a system with adverse 
selection (the provider has private information about the patients’ risk profile) and moral hazard 
(the payer does not know whether or not the treatment that is recommended by the test result is 
followed). The provider makes the testing and treatment decisions, and the payer incentivizes the 
provider with a payment contract in order to maximize social welfare. Consistent with current 
practice for the Oncotype Dx and Tissue of Origin tests, we assume that the test result is sent 
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directly to the provider. Throughout the paper we use the term “advanced treatment” to mean the 
provider is treating the patient with a specific treatment (e.g., chemotherapy or a targeted 
treatment), that would be recommended from the results of a diagnostic test. We use the term 
“basic treatment” for a base case scenario where the provider is not treating the patient with an 
advance treatment, but instead treat the patient by other means that are appropriate given her pre-
test diagnosis (e.g., hormone therapy or empiric chemotherapy). All costs and benefits of the 
advanced treatment are assumed to be relative to the costs and benefits of the basic treatment 
(that are normalized to zero). The provider incurs a treatment cost for using advanced treatment 
(e.g., chemotherapy cost plus costs associated with administering treatment and monitoring 
patients) and is compensated via his contract with the payer, while the test cost is directly billed 
to the payer. 
The provider’s patients can have different risk levels. The risk profile of the patients is 
private information to the provider because the provider is able to make several observations 
about each patient that are not known to the payer. An example of private information is “Has a 
stable lifestyle”, which can influence many factors such as adherence to medication 
recommendations and preventive measures to prevent recurrence, and thus influence the success 
of a given treatment recommendation. For example, Bangsberg et al. (2000) found a strong 
inverse relationship between HIV viral load and adherence to protease inhibitors, and Kaposy et 
al. (2017) described the efforts made in several HIV clinics to monitor and improve adherence 
among patients with poor adherence. Other examples include detailed family history or various 
risk factors that are disclosed to a physician but not formally recorded in patient charts. Ferris et 
al. (2017) recommend incorporating patients’ goals and preferences into treatment decisions, but 
neither of these factors are routinely collected on patient charts. Guidelines from the National 
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Cholesterol Education Program recognize the importance of diet and exercise as important 
modifiable risk factors for coronary heart disease (Grundy et al. 2002), yet this information may 
not be recorded in insurer or administrative databases in an standardized way, if it is recorded at 
all. In addition, the results of some lab tests will be sent directly to the physician. Depending on 
the structure of the payer’s administrative databases, the payer may know that a test has been 
ordered (because of an associated billing code), but not know the result of the test. A 
proliferation of new tests, each with their own reporting standards, will likely exacerbate this 
problem. For instance, the Tissue of Origin test reports results as a set of 15 similarity scores, 
along with a “most likely tissue of origin” and a “degree of confidence”. Recording the full 
results of this test would require customization of existing databases, which may not be a priority 
for the payer, particularly if the tests are used for rare conditions. The extent of this source of 
information asymmetry will vary among payers depending on the structure of their health 
records systems and their sophistication in using the information collected—but even for a 
sophisticated payer, the physician will know more about a patient than the payer does. 
For this analysis, without loss of generality, we normalize the number of patients of the 
provider to one. We assume that patients can be one of two types: high-risk (type-𝐻) and low-
risk (type-𝐿). The recurrence probability (risk score) of type-𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿} patients is characterized 
by a random variable, 𝑟𝑖 ∈ [0,1], with corresponding distributions 𝐹𝐻(𝑟) and 𝐹𝐿(𝑟) with density 
functions 𝑓𝐻(𝑟) and 𝑓𝐿(𝑟). Thus, the expected recurrence probability of type-𝑖 patients is 𝐸[𝑟𝑖] =
∫ 𝑦𝑓𝑖(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
1
0
. We assume that patients’ risk distribution function 𝐹𝑖(𝑟) is continuous and strictly 
increasing on [0,1]. Moreover, we assume that 𝐹𝐻(𝑟) ≤ 𝐹𝐿(𝑟) for all 𝑟, such that type-𝐻 patients 
have a higher expected recurrence probability than type-𝐿 patients. The provider can observe the 
type but does not know a patient’s recurrence probability 𝑟𝑖 unless the patient undergoes the test, 
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and ordering the test reveals this patient’s recurrence probability to the provider. The payer only 
knows the probability of the patient type to be of type-𝑖 with probability 𝛽𝑖, where 𝛽𝐿 + 𝛽𝐻 = 1.  
We assume that advanced treatment can reduce the recurrence probability to 𝑘𝑟𝑖, where 
0 < 𝑘 < 1 is the advanced treatment’s hazard ratio such that the advanced treatment is more 
effective when the hazard ratio 𝑘 is small. This assumption is consistent with the use of the 21-
gene assay for breast cancer where the original validation study found that the difference in the 
probability of recurrence for women treated with chemotherapy versus hormone therapy alone 
was increasing in the recurrence score (Paik et al. 2006). 
The payer offers a menu of contracts 𝜻𝒊 = {𝑤𝑖, 𝑏𝑡𝑖, 𝑏𝑛𝑖} that depends on the risk 
distribution of patient types (time 𝑡0; Figure 1). The contracts consist of the following three 
terms: 1) A fixed bundled payment for an episode of advanced treatment (𝑤𝑖), 2) a reward for 
stable health of patients treated with advanced treatment (𝑏𝑡𝑖), and 3) a reward for stable health 
of patients treated with basic treatment (𝑏𝑛𝑖). The first term of the contract (𝑤𝑖) only pays for 
quantity of treatment and captures the most widely implemented payment method in different 
healthcare systems. For example, 𝑤𝑖 can be interpreted as FFS payment when it covers the cost 
of an episode of advanced treatment. However, when 𝑤𝑖 is different from the total cost of the 
advanced treatment it can be interpreted as a target price (cf. CJR model) – meaning that the 
provider might receive more or less than the total cost of the advanced treatment. The next two 
terms are the performance-based payments that depend on the health outcome of patients as well 
as the treatment choice of the provider. After the payment contracts are offered by the payer, a 
patient will arrive (𝑡1). The patient type is either low-risk or high-risk, which is observable to the 
provider but not to the payer. Next, the provider will decide whether or not to order the 
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diagnostic test (𝑡2). If the test is ordered the provider will receive the test results from the lab (𝑡3) 
and decide whether to use the advanced treatment given the risk score of the patient. However, if 
the test is not ordered the provider will make the decision on using the advance treatment only 
based on the patient’s type. The provider will treat the patient either using the advanced or the 
basic treatment (𝑡4). Finally, the provider will receive the episode payment after the treatment 
(𝑡5) and the reward payments after the health outcome of the patient is realized (𝑡6). Figure 1 
illustrates the sequence of events. 
Figure 1: Sequence of events 
 
An episode of advanced treatment costs 𝑐 for each patient. Every patient with recurrence 
who only received basic treatment incurs a welfare loss ℎ that represents both the opportunity 
cost and psychological cost of a patient who is not properly treated. Thus, a payer that maximizes 
social welfare has to account for this welfare loss. We assume that this welfare loss will also 
cause a disutility 𝛼ℎ for the provider. Existing literature has explained the provider’s disutility as 
being either a result of a loss of reputation (Adida et al. 2016) or disutility caused by altruism 
about patients' health (Montanera 2016). We do not argue for either but instead claim 𝛼ℎ to be an 
aggregate value representing both effects. When 𝛼 = 0, adverse patient outcomes cause no 
disutility for the provider – i.e., no damage to the provider’s reputation, and no harm associated 
with the provider’s concerns for the welfare of his patients. We examine the impact of 𝛼 on 
social welfare in Section 5. 
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There is a net monetary benefit 𝜆𝑠 associated with a patient with no recurrence (i.e., 
stable health) and 𝜆𝑟 in case of recurrence, 𝜆𝑟 < 𝜆𝑠. The advanced treatment may be associated 
with toxicities and adverse events. These cause the payer’s net monetary benefit to decrease by 
𝑧, which is the expected cost of adverse events. We assume that 𝑧 is independent of 𝑟 on the 
grounds that adverse events are driven by specific drug regimens, whereas 𝑟 is driven by genetic 
risk factors. This is a common assumption in models used to evaluate cost-effectiveness of 21-
gene assay (e.g., Hornberger et al. 2005, Hornberger et al. 2011, Hannouf et al. 2012, Vanderlaan 
et al. 2011). 
3.1. Provider’s problem 
For each patient, the provider has to decide whether or not to order the test and whether or not to 
use the advanced treatment option.  
Remark 1: If the provider orders the test, then the provider chooses a threshold 𝜏𝑖 for each 
patient type and only uses advanced treatment for patients whose recurrence probability is 
higher than this threshold (i.e., 𝑟𝑖 > 𝜏𝑖). This is a result of the recurrence probability being 
continuous and monotonic, and the treatment effect being proportional to the recurrence 
probability (i.e., 𝑘𝑟𝑖). 
Because the risk score of a patient is only revealed if the test is ordered, the treatment 
threshold (𝜏𝑖) decision of the provider is conditional on his test-ordering decision. We use a 
binary variable 𝑥𝑖 ∈ {0,1} to denote whether the provider orders the test (𝑥𝑖 = 1) or not (𝑥𝑖 = 0) 
when patients are of type-𝑖. Thus, for a given patient type, the provider has three options (Figure 
2):  Option 0 – treat patients with advanced treatment without ordering the test; Option 1 – do not 
order the test and treat patients with basic treatment; and Option 2 – order the test and use 
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advanced treatment only if a patient’s recurrence probability is higher than a treatment threshold 
(𝑟𝑖 > 𝜏𝑖). 
Figure 2: Provider’s treatment choices 
 
If the provider chooses to treat patients with advanced treatment without ordering the test 
(Option 0), then the provider’s objective function 𝑔𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝜏𝑖) is:  
𝑔𝑖(0,0) = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐 + 𝑏𝑡𝑖 ∫ (1 − 𝑘𝑦)𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
1
0
                                                                                         (1) 
The first two terms are the fixed bundled payment less the cost for an episode of advanced 
treatment and the third term is the reward payment for patients with stable health who were 
treated with advanced treatment. If the provider chooses not to order the test and treat patients 
using basic treatment (Option 1), then the provider’s objective function is:  
𝑔𝑖(0,1) = 𝑏𝑛𝑖 ∫ (1 − 𝑦)𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
1
0
− 𝛼ℎ ∫ 𝑦𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
1
0
                                                                          (2) 
The first term is the reward payment for patients with stable health who were treated with basic 
treatment. The second term is the provider’s disutility when patients who were treated with basic 
treatment experience a recurrence. Finally, if the provider orders the test (Option 2) and only 
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uses advanced treatment if a patient’s recurrence score is above the treatment threshold (𝑟𝑖 > 𝜏𝑖), 
then the provider’s objective function is: 
𝑔𝑖(1, 𝜏𝑖) = (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐) ∫ 𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
1
𝜏𝑖
+ 𝑏𝑛𝑖 ∫ (1 − 𝑦)𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
𝜏𝑖
0
+ 𝑏𝑡𝑖 ∫ (1 − 𝑘𝑦)𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
1
𝜏𝑖
               (3)
− 𝛼ℎ ∫ 𝑦𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
𝜏𝑖
0
 
The first term is the fixed bundled payment less the cost for an episode of advanced treatment for 
patients who treated with advanced treatment. The second and the third terms are the reward 
payments for patients with stable health, and the last term is the provider’s disutility when 
patients who treated with basic treatment experience a recurrence. A similar approach to 
modeling the disutility associated with adverse outcomes has been widely used in the literature to 
model the provider’s objective function and to incorporate the provider’s concerns regarding the 
health outcome of the patients (e.g., Dai et al. 2015, Adida et al. 2016, Dai et al. 2016, 
Montanera 2016).  
The provider’s problem is to maximize his objective function, given the menu of 
contracts offered by the payer 𝜻𝒊 = {𝑤𝑖, 𝑏𝑡𝑖, 𝑏𝑛𝑖}, by choosing the treatment choice for each 
patient type.  
3.2. Payer’s problem 
We assume that the payer’s objective is to maximize social welfare, which is the monetary value 
of patients’ health outcome minus the total costs of providing care. Thus, assuming the cost of 
the test is 𝐵, the payer’s objective function, when patients are of type-𝑖 is: 
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𝑣𝑖(𝜻𝒊, 𝑥𝑖, 𝜏𝑖) = (𝜆𝑠 − 𝑏𝑛𝑖) ∫ (1 − 𝑦)𝑓𝑖(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
𝜏𝑖
0
+ (𝜆𝑠 − 𝑧 − 𝑏𝑡𝑖) ∫ (1 − 𝑘𝑦)𝑓𝑖(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
1
𝜏𝑖
               (4) 
+(𝜆𝑟 − ℎ) ∫ 𝑦 𝑓𝑖(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
𝜏𝑖
0
+ (𝜆𝑟 − 𝑧) ∫ 𝑘𝑦 𝑓𝑖(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
1
𝜏𝑖
− 𝑤𝑖 ∫ 𝑓𝑖(𝑦)ⅆ𝑦
1
𝜏𝑖
− 𝑥𝑖𝐵 
The first two terms are the monetary benefit, less the reward payments to the provider, for 
patients with stable health who are either treated with basic or advanced treatment. The third and 
the fourth terms are the monetary benefit for patients with recurrence who are either treated with 
basic or advanced treatment. The fifth and the sixth terms are the payments for an episode of 
advanced treatment and the test cost. Note that the test cost can only be incurred if the provider 
orders the test, i.e, setting 𝑥𝑖 = 1 under Option 2. The payer decides on the payment contracts 
that link the two parties. The payer solves the following program.  
 
max
𝜻𝑳,𝜻𝑯
 𝑉 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝜻𝒊, 𝑥𝑖 , 𝜏𝑖)
𝑖∈{𝐿,𝐻}
                                                                                                                 (5) 
𝑠. 𝑡. {𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝜏𝑖
∗} = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥𝑖∈{0,1}
0≤𝜏𝑖≤1
𝑔𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝜏𝑖|𝜻𝒊)                                                                                 (𝑂𝑇𝐶) 
𝑔𝐿(𝑥𝐿
∗, 𝜏𝐿
∗|𝜻𝑳) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥𝐿∈{0,1}
0≤𝜏𝐿≤1
𝑔𝐿(𝑥𝐿 , 𝜏𝐿|𝜻𝑯)       (𝐼𝐶𝐿) 
𝑔𝐻(𝑥𝐻
∗ , 𝜏𝐻
∗ |𝜻𝑯) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥𝐻∈{0,1}
0≤𝜏𝐻≤1
𝑔𝐻(𝑥𝐻, 𝜏𝐻|𝜻𝑳)        (𝐼𝐶𝐻) 
𝑔𝐿(𝑥𝐿
∗, 𝜏𝐿
∗) ≥ 0          (𝐼𝑅𝐿) 
𝑔𝐻(𝑥𝐻
∗ , 𝜏𝐻
∗ ) ≥ 0         (𝐼𝑅𝐻) 
The payer’s objective function is the total social welfare in a system with information 
asymmetry. The 𝑂𝑇𝐶 (optimal treatment choice) constraints are moral hazard incentive 
constraints to ensure that under the payment contracts {𝜻𝑳, 𝜻𝑯} the provider’s optimal treatment 
20 
 
 
choice is {𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝜏𝑖
∗}. The next two constraints (𝐼𝐶𝐿 and 𝐼𝐶𝐻) are the provider’s adverse selection 
incentive-compatibility constraints. They ensure that the provider prefers contract 𝜻𝒊 for type-𝑖 
patients to the contract for the other patient type and thus prevent patient misrepresentation. Note 
that, if the provider misrepresents a patient he may also choose to change the treatment choice. 
This is represented by the provider’s decision variables in the right-hand side of the 𝐼𝐶𝐿 and 𝐼𝐶𝐻 
constraints. In particular, 𝐼𝐶𝐿 constraint means that when a provider faces a low-risk patient, he 
would be better off choosing the contract that is designed for low-risk patients. Similarly, 𝐼𝐶𝐻 
constraint ensures that a provider would choose a contract designed for high-risk patients when 
he faces a high-risk patient. The last two constraints (𝐼𝑅𝐿 and 𝐼𝑅𝐻) are the provider’s 
participation or individual-rationality constraints for each patient type—meaning that the 
contracts for each patient type result in non-negative payoff for the provider. 
We derive the equilibrium solution following the standard approach (Laffont and 
Martimort 2001; Chapter 7, Bolton and Dewatripont 2005; Chapter 6). A similar approach is 
used in other papers that consider both adverse selection and moral hazard (e.g., Yaesoubi et al. 
2011, Xiao and Xu 2012, Chick et al. 2016). Specifically, first, based on the extended revelation 
principle (Laffont and Martimort 2001; page 258), we restrict our attention to direct mechanisms 
where the contracts are a pair of optimal treatment choices for the two patient types (i.e., 
[𝜻𝑳, 𝜏𝐿, 𝑥𝐿] and [𝜻𝑯, 𝜏𝐻, 𝑥𝐻]). Next, because the provider is exposed to higher risk when treating 
high-risk patients, the provider’s participation constraints require the contract for high-risk 
patients to have higher expected value than the contact for low-risk patients. Therefore, for high-
risk patients the provider would not deviate to the contract designed for low-risk patients, and 
thus 𝐼𝐶𝐻 will not bind at the optimum. Furthermore, the provider has an incentive to 
misrepresent low-risk patients as high-risk patients, so for low-risk patients the provider can 
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benefit from his private information, and thus 𝐼𝑅𝐿 will not bind at the optimum. Thus, omitting 
𝐼𝐶𝐻 and 𝐼𝑅𝐿, the constraints 𝐼𝑅𝐻 and 𝐼𝐶𝐿 are binding at the optimum for all treatment choices 
of the provider.1 Therefore, the payer’s problem reduces to a maximization problem where the 
payer chooses optimal contracts subject to the two binding constraints (𝐼𝐶𝐿 and 𝐼𝑅𝐻). Since the 
provider’s treatment threshold decision is private information (moral hazard), the payer chooses 
payment terms such that the provider’s best response results in payer’s optimal treatment 
threshold. 
The underlying problem is novel in the sense that the provider has two decisions and the 
treatment threshold decision is conditional on the test-ordering decision. Moreover, the treatment 
threshold is the provider’s only hidden action (moral hazard) whereas the test-ordering decision 
is public information. Therefore, if the provider does not order the test for a patient, the payer 
knows that the provider has chosen to treat the patient with advanced or basic treatment without 
knowing patient’s recurrence probability (Option 0 or 1). Given that the treatment threshold 
decision is conditional on the test-ordering decision, the provider has nine treatment choices 
because there are two patient types and three treatment options {𝑥𝑖, 𝜏𝑖} per patient type. We solve 
the payer’s maximization problem for each of the nine treatment choices (cf. Table A1 in the 
Appendix). In the equilibrium solution, given the model parameters the payer offers a menu of 
contracts that results in one of the nine treatment choices with the highest social welfare. The full 
details on the derivation of the equilibrium solution are shown in the Appendix.  
                                                          
1 To relate to the literature in the supply chain coordination (e.g., Çakanyıldırım et al., 2012; Huang et al 2015; Yan 
et al., 2015), the provider with a high-risk patient corresponds to the supplier with a lower capability (high cost or 
low quality), and vice versa. Therefore, IRL and ICH are binding in those papers, while IRH and ICL are binding in 
our paper. 
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4. System Optimum 
In this section, we present the optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry 
(second-best policy). In section 4.1, we analyze a system with full information (first-best policy) 
to understand the inefficiencies caused by private information of the provider. We also explain 
how the proposed payment model outperforms current payment models in section 4.2. 
Define ?̂? =
𝑧+𝑐
(1+𝛼)ℎ+(1−𝑘)(𝜆𝑠−𝜆𝑟)
 as the critical treatment threshold; ?̂? is large when the 
advanced treatment’s adverse events (𝑧) or cost (𝑐) is large, or when the cost associated with the 
provider’s reputation concerns and altruistic behaviour (𝛼) is small.  
Lemma 1 presents a property of the optimal treatment threshold choice of the provider. 
Lemma 1: When the provider orders the test (𝑥𝑖
∗ = 1), the optimal treatment threshold is the 
same for both patient types and is equal to the critical treatment threshold (i.e., 𝜏𝑖
∗ = ?̂?). 
Lemma 1 states that in the optimal solution the payer designs contracts such that when 
the provider orders the test he will choose the same treatment threshold for both patient types 
that is equal to the critical treatment threshold. This is because the treatment threshold 
corresponds to the “marginal patient” for whom the provider is indifferent about treatment and 
the determination of this marginal patient is independent of the full distribution of risks for the 
patient type 𝐹𝑖(𝑟). Thus, the change to social welfare from treating or not treating a marginal 
patient with advanced treatment is independent of patients’ risk distribution. 
For expositional convenience, we define Γ(𝜏) = 𝛼ℎ
∫ 𝐹𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
𝜏
0 −∫ 𝐹𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
𝜏
0
1−𝜏+∫ 𝐹𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
𝜏
0
 where Γ(𝜏) can 
be interpreted as the provider’s relative cost of not using advanced treatment for high-risk 
patients versus low-risk patients. The value Γ(𝜏) is zero when the distributions of risk of the two 
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types are identical; it increases in the difference between the two types of patients and in the 
treatment threshold 𝜏. We define the following thresholds: 
 ?̅?𝐿 =
𝑧+𝑐
?̂?
{∫ 𝐹𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
+ min[0, 𝐸[𝑟𝐿] − ?̂?]}             (6) 
 ?̅?𝐻 =
𝑧+𝑐
?̂?
{∫ 𝐹𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
−
𝛽
1−𝛽
?̂?
𝑧+𝑐
Γ(?̂?) + min [0, 𝐸[𝑟𝐻] − ?̂? +
𝛽
1−𝛽
?̂?
𝑧+𝑐
Γ(1)]} (7) 
𝜏̅ solves ?̂? − (
𝛽
1−𝛽
?̂?
𝑧+𝑐
𝛤(?̂?) + ∫ 𝐹𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
− ∫ 𝐹𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
) = 𝐸[𝑟𝐿]                      (8) 
?̂?𝐿 = 𝐸[𝑟𝐿]                                                             (9) 
?̂?𝐻 =
𝐸[r𝐻]
1− 
𝛽
1−𝛽
 
𝛤(1)
𝑧+𝑐
                                                          (10) 
Threshold ?̅?𝑖 can be interpreted as the maximum willingness-to-pay for the test. There is 
a trade-off between the cost of the test and the expected risk to the patients. If the expected risk 
to the patients is much lower (higher) than the treatment threshold, then there is only a small 
probability that a patient would (would not) require advanced treatment given the test results. 
Therefore, as the distance between the expected risk and the treatment threshold ?̂? gets larger, the 
value of the test diminishes because the probability of making similar treatment decisions with 
and without the test gets higher. 
Lemma 2: Define 𝑧̅ = (1 + 𝛼)ℎ + (1 − 𝑘)(𝜆𝑠 − 𝜆𝑟) and 𝑐̅ = (1 + 𝛼)ℎ + (1 − 𝑘)(𝜆𝑠 − 𝜆𝑟) – 𝑧. 
If  𝑧 > 𝑧̅ or 𝑐 > 𝑐̅, then the patients are never treated with advanced treatment. 
Lemma 2 shows that if the cost of adverse events is sufficiently large (𝑧 > 𝑧̅) or the 
advanced treatment is sufficiently costly (𝑐 > 𝑐̅), then the advanced treatment is never used. In 
24 
 
 
that case, it is clearly never optimal to order the test. For the remainder of the paper, we focus on 
the interesting region where 𝑧 < 𝑧̅ and 𝑐 < 𝑐̅. 
Proposition 1 presents the optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry 
(second-best policy), and is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Proposition 1: The optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry is one of the 
following five cases: 
 Case 1: For both patient types, do not order the test and treat the patients with advanced 
treatment if and only if 𝐵 > ?̅?𝐿 and ?̂? < ?̂?𝐿 
 Case 2: For type-L patients, order the test and use advanced treatment for patients with 
𝑟 > ?̂?; For type-H patients, do not order the test and treat the patients with advanced 
treatment if and only if 𝐵 ≤ ?̅?𝐿and ?̂? < 𝜏̅ 
 Case 3: For type-L patients, do not order the test and do not use advanced treatment; 
For type-H patients, do not order the test and treat the patients with advanced treatment 
if and only if 𝐵 > max {?̅?𝐿 , ?̅?𝐻} and ?̂? ≥ ?̂?𝐿 and ?̂? < ?̂?𝐻 
 Case 4: For type-L patients, do not order the test and do not use advanced treatment; 
For type-H patients, order the test and use advanced treatment for patients with 𝑟 > ?̂? if 
and only if 𝐵 ≤ ?̅?𝐻 and ?̂? ≥ 𝜏̅ 
 Case 5: For both patient types, do not order the test and do not use advanced treatment if 
and only if 𝐵 > ?̅?𝐻 and ?̂? ≥ ?̂?𝐻 
Consider the case where the cost of the diagnostic test is sufficiently high, such that the 
payer should not motivate the provider to order the test, regardless of the patient type (Cases 1, 3, 
5). In all three cases, the potential benefit of ordering the test—that is, directing advanced 
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treatment to those patients that derive the greatest benefit—does not justify the testing cost. It is 
analogous to public health and health policy guidelines (e.g., for screening, vaccination, etc.) 
where the guideline varies in the population prevalence. For example, one analysis of HIV 
screening concluded that one-time screening in the general population might be cost-effective in 
areas where HIV prevalence exceeds 3.0 percent (Paltiel et al. 2005). 
Figure 3: Optimal treatment decisions for the system with information asymmetry 
 
Next, consider the case where the diagnostic test is relatively inexpensive (𝐵 is small), 
such that social welfare may increase if the provider orders the test for the patients (Cases 2, 4). 
When the critical treatment threshold ?̂? is small (Case 2), the provider should test low-risk 
patients, and treat them with advanced treatment when their recurrence probability is larger than 
?̂?. However, in Case 2, high-risk patients are expected to have a recurrence risk larger than the 
threshold ?̂?, so the payer should design a contract that motivates the provider to treat high-risk 
patients with advanced treatment without ordering the test. On the other hand, when the critical 
treatment threshold is large (Case 4), the provider should test high-risk patients and treat them 
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with advanced treatment when their recurrence probability is larger than ?̂?. However, in Case 4, 
low-risk patients are expected to have a recurrence risk lower than the critical treatment 
threshold, so the payer should design a contract that motivates the provider to treat low-risk 
patients with basic treatment without ordering the test. 
Corollary 1 shows how the provider may benefit from his private information. 
Corollary 1: In Cases 1, 2, and 3, the patient type does not affect the provider’s profit. In Cases 
4 and 5, the provider has a higher profit from treating low-risk patients than from treating high-
risk patients. 
In Cases 1, 2, and 3, the provider always treats high-risk patients with advanced 
treatment. As a result, the payer can design a contract for the provider for high-risk patients that 
(1) does not require any reward payments (i.e., 𝑏𝑛𝐻 = 0 and 𝑏𝑡𝐻 = 0), and (2) sets the fixed per 
patient treatment bundled payment for an episode of advanced treatment to be the cost of 
advanced treatment (i.e., 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑐), leading to the provider having zero profit. Note that this 
contract structure is independent of the patients’ risk distribution because there is no reward 
payments, so the provider with low-risk patients would also have the same profit if he were to 
pick this contract (incentive-compatibility constraint - 𝐼𝐶𝐿). As a result, the payer can design a 
contract such that the provider would also have zero profit from low-risk patients. Thus, patient 
type does not affect the provider’s profit for these cases. 
In Cases 4 and 5, the provider should not always treat high-risk patients with advanced 
treatment, so the payer must design a contract that includes reward payments for not using 
advanced treatment for high-risk patients (i.e., 𝑏𝑛𝐻 > 0). While treating high-risk patients will 
have no profit for the provider (𝐼𝑅𝐻 is binding), the provider would have a positive profit when 
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picking this contract for low-risk patients. This is because not treating low-risk patients with 
advanced treatment has less risk for the provider. Therefore, to prevent the provider from 
misrepresenting low-risk patients, the payer has to incentivize the provider by offering a profit 
larger than that offered for high-risk patients (i.e., information rent). In particular, the provider 
would have zero profit from high-risk patients in both cases, but the provider would have profit 
Γ(?̂?) in Case 4, and Γ(1) in Case 5 from low-risk patients. (Recall that Γ(𝜏) is the provider’s 
relative cost of not using advanced treatment for a patient. The argument of Γ is ?̂? in Case 4 
because the provider does not use advanced treatment for high-risk patients with recurrence risk 
smaller than ?̂?, and the argument of Γ is 1 in Case 5 because the provider never treats high-risk 
patients with advanced treatment, which is equivalent to setting the treatment threshold to one.)  
Corollary 2 formally defines test cost thresholds beyond which it is never optimal to use 
the test. 
Corollary 2: In the equilibrium solution, there exists an upper bound for the test cost such that 
 if 𝐵 > ?̅?𝐻|?̂?=?̂?𝐻  then test is never ordered for high-risk patient type, and 
 if 𝐵 > ?̅?𝐿|?̂?=?̂?𝐿 then test is never ordered for either patient type, and 
 ?̅?𝐿|?̂?=?̂?𝐿 > ?̅?𝐻|?̂?=?̂?𝐻. 
Corollary 2 shows that regardless of the risk level of the patients, there is a level for test 
cost (?̅?𝐿|?̂?=?̂?𝐿) beyond which it never makes sense to use the test. It is intuitive that a threshold 
for the test cost exists, since there is a trade-off between the cost of the test and the value of the 
test in terms of improved treatment decisions. However, it may seem counterintuitive that this 
threshold is higher for low-risk patients (i.e., ?̅?𝐿|?̂?=?̂?𝐿 > ?̅?𝐻|?̂?=?̂?𝐻). This is because in Case 4, the 
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payer incurs information rent when motivating the provider to test high-risk patients (cf. 
Corollary 1). Therefore, ordering the test for high-risk patients will increase social welfare only 
when the test cost is low. On the other hand, in Case 2, the information rent is zero, and thus it is 
optimal for the payer to motivate the provider to test low-risk patients even at higher test cost 
amounts.  
Corollary 3 presents a property of the optimal contracts (Table A2 in the Appendix 
presents the optimal contracts for each of the five cases in the equilibrium solution). 
Corollary 3: In the optimal contracts, the provider never imposes a penalty on the provider. 
The payer can offer a contract with only non-negative payment terms as long as the 
provider receives reward payments for stable health among patients who are not treated with 
advanced treatment (i.e., 𝑏𝑛𝑖 ≥ 0). This is because the provider incurs a cost related to his 
reputation and his altruistic behaviour when a recurrence happens to patients treated with basic 
treatment, so the provider has an incentive to overuse advanced treatment. The proposed 
contracts counteract this by compensating the provider for stable health of patients who have not 
received advanced treatment. Note that the payer cannot reach a higher social welfare by 
including other contract terms, such as penalty payments for recurrence among patients treated 
with advanced or basic treatment. This is because the proposed payment model already 
incorporates the health outcome of patients in the payment terms. Thus, this result highlights the 
necessity of incentivizing the provider based on his treatment choice (such as incentivizing for 
not prescribing an episode of chemotherapy treatment for breast cancer patients). Having non-
negative payments is a desirable feature of contract design in healthcare applications because 
negative payments might be impossible to implement in practice and could cause additional 
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incentive problems. A similar issue has been noted in other papers on the topic (Yaesoubi and 
Roberts 2011, Chick et al. 2016). 
Note that when the reward payments are zero (i.e., 𝑏𝑡𝑖 = 𝑏𝑛𝑖 = 0), the resulting contracts 
are simple bundled payments (i.e., 𝑤𝑖) that only pay for the quantity of the treatment without any 
consideration of the quality of the treatment. These types of contracts are similar to the 
commonly used FFS payment models. We show that when it is optimal to use the diagnostic test 
(Cases 2 and 4) the optimal contracts cannot be of this form (Table A2 in the Appendix). 
Consequently, the advent of new diagnostic tests makes current reimbursement models that only 
reward the intensity of work sub-optimal and necessitates development of alternative 
reimbursement models such as performance-based bundled payment models. 
Corollary 4: Under the payment scheme proposed in this section, in the equilibrium of a system 
with information asymmetry it is never optimal to test patients from both patient risk profiles, 
even when the test is free (i.e., 𝐵 = 0). 
Corollary 4 is true for all optimal cases presented in Proposition 1. In Case 2, where ?̂? is 
relatively small (Figure 3), advanced treatment’s cost and adverse events are relatively small 
compared to the provider’s cost when recurrence happens to patients treated with basic 
treatment. In this case, the provider uses advanced treatment for high-risk patients without 
ordering the test; accordingly, as stated in Corollary 1, the provider will have zero profit from 
treating both patient types. If the provider were to test high-risk patients, the test results might 
suggest that a high-risk patient does not need to be treated with advanced treatment; therefore, 
the provider would expect to have a disutility in case of a recurrence. This will require having 
higher-valued contract payment terms for high-risk patients if the provider were to order the test 
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for high-risk patients in Case 2. Following higher-valued contracts for high-risk patients, to keep 
the provider from misrepresenting low-risk patients, the payer needs to offer higher-valued 
contracts for low-risk patients as well. As a result, in order to avoid the additional costs 
generated through higher-valued contract terms, in Case 2 the payer should not motivate the 
provider to order the test for high-risk patients.  
In Case 4, the cost for a recurrence in patients treated with basis treatment is relatively 
small, and the provider treats low-risk patients with basic treatment without ordering the test. If 
the provider were to test low-risk patients, there is a small probability that the test suggests a 
low-risk patient to be treated with advanced treatment. However, the savings to the cost related 
to treating low-risk patients with advanced treatment (as it might be suggested by the test) does 
not justify higher payment terms that is required to motivate the provider to test low-risk 
patients. Thus, in Case 4 the payer should not motivate the provider to test low-risk patients, 
even when the test is free. 
4.1. Full information  
To examine whether the finding of Corollary 4 is due to decentralized decision-making or 
information asymmetry, we consider a system where there is a perfect information flow between 
the payer and the provider (first-best policy). The derivation of equilibrium of this system is 
presented in the Appendix, and the equilibrium solution is illustrated in Figure 4. The optimal 
treatment threshold in a system with perfect information is equal to the critical treatment 
threshold (?̂?) because it does not depend on the patients’ risk profile and thus is not affected by 
information asymmetry in the system. Unlike the system with information asymmetry 
(Proposition 1), under complete information there is a new optimal case (Case 6) where the payer 
should motivate the provider to order the test for both patient types. This occurs when the test 
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cost is sufficiently low. This is because, in the full information scenario, social welfare is only 
affected by the health outcome of patients and not by private information of the provider. In the 
full information scenario, advanced treatment is used only for a patient that can benefit from it. 
However, when the provider has private information, not all patients who require advanced 
treatment will receive it and not all the patients treated with advanced treatment will benefit from 
it. This finding illustrates the importance of information flow in a healthcare system in order to 
reduce the inefficiencies caused by the information asymmetry. 
Figure 4: Optimal treatment decisions for the system with full information 
 
Remark 2: The highest willingness-to-pay for the test in the system with full information (first-
best policy) is independent of patients’ risk profile, and is the same as the highest willingness-to-
pay for the test in the system with information asymmetry (?̅?𝐿|?̂?=?̂?𝐿). This is because in Case 2 the 
provider does not benefit from his private information and thus the payer’s willingness-to-pay 
for the test is not affected by the information asymmetry. 
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4.2. Alternate payment models   
We also compare the proposed payment model with two other arrangements that are similar to 
currently implemented payment models. The derivation of equilibrium for these payment models 
are available from authors upon request.  
First, we analyze the performance of a single performance-based payment contract that is 
offered to both patient types (i.e., 𝜻′ = {𝑤, 𝑏}) in a system with information asymmetry. This is 
similar to the OCM payment model. Under a single contract the payer cannot motivate the 
provider to treat each patient type differently. Therefore, the optimal treatment choices are Cases 
1, 5 and 6. Note that, unlike in the full information scenario, in the presence of information 
asymmetry it is costly for the payer to test both patient types (Case 6) and thus this payment 
structure is always weakly dominated by our proposed payment model (i.e., 𝜻𝒊 = {𝑤𝑖, 𝑏𝑡𝑖, 𝑏𝑛𝑖}).  
Second, we analyze an alternative model where the payer offers a menu of contracts in 
which reward payments are only tied to the health outcome of a patient (i.e., 𝜻𝒊
′′ = {𝑤𝑖, 𝑏𝑖}). 
This is similar to the CJR payment model where a risk stratification methodology is used to set 
different target prices for different patient types. The optimal treatment choices under this model 
are qualitatively similar to the 5 cases presented in Figure 3. However, the payment model that 
we propose can better utilize the optional diagnostic test by better managing the inefficiency in 
the system because by incorporating the treatment choice of the provider into the payment terms 
the payer can further reduce the information rent in Case 4. Both contract structures analyzed in 
this section have inferior performance to the proposed payment model, and hence emphasize the 
importance of development of alternative reimbursement models for different healthcare systems 
given the availability and use of personalized medicine. As in Fuloria and Zenios (2001) we 
investigated the implications of different payment models using an illustrative application. 
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Figure 5 illustrates expected social welfare under each payment model using parameters listed in 
Table 1 and full details are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Table 1: Parameter estimations for numerical examples 
Model parameter Estimated value Source 
Cost for an episode of treatment (𝑐) $30,000 Hornberger et al. (2005) * 
Treatment adverse events (𝑧) $19,000 Hornberger et al. (2005) ** 
Monetary benefit from stable health (𝜆𝑠) $100,000 Shiroiwa et al. (2010) † 
Monetary benefit from recurrence (𝜆𝑟) $60,000 Hornberger et al. (2005) ‡ 
Test cost (𝐵) $4,175 Ray (2011) 
Hazard ratio (𝑘) 0.95 Paik et al. (2006) § 
Probability of type-L (𝛽𝐿) 0.5 Assumption 
Type-L patient distribution 𝑓𝐿(𝑟) = 2 − 2𝑟 Assumption ¶ 
Type-H patient distribution 𝑓𝐻(𝑟) = 2𝑟 Assumption ¶ 
* Estimates of adjuvant chemotherapy costs vary depending on the type of regimen used. We estimate the cost of a 
treatment episode per course of trastuzumab.  
**Average cost of minor, major, and fatal side effects.  
† Since health quality that is considered for reward payments is measured for a six-month period after an episode of 
treatment, we only consider willingness-to-pay for one additional quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained. 
‡ Quality of life would drop to 0.7 when recurrence is stable, and to 0.5 when recurrence is progressive (base value 
0.98). We use the average value of 0.6 to represent the average willingness-to-pay for QALY of patients with 
recurrence. 
§ Proportion of patients free of distant recurrence at 10 years for tamoxifen-treated patients and tamoxifen plus 
chemotherapy-treated patients across all risk groups. 
¶ These distributions are assumed for illustrative purposes. We conducted experiments with other distributions and 
obtained qualitatively similar results. 
Figure 5: Social welfare under different payment models 
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5. Comparative Statistics 
In this section, we examine how social welfare is affected by treatment characteristics and the 
provider’s concern for the health outcome of his patients.  
For expositional convenience, we define: 
 Ω𝑖 = 1 − ?̂? + ∫ 𝐹𝑖(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
        (11) 
Proposition 2 examines how social welfare is affected when patients treated with basic 
treatment experience a recurrence. 
Proposition 2:  
a) Social welfare increases when the welfare loss of a patient with recurrence who only 
received basic treatment has higher impact on the provider (i.e., 𝛼 increases) if and only if 
 𝐵 ≤ ?̅?𝐻 and 𝐸[𝑟𝐿] ≤  
𝛼ℎ?̂?2(𝐹𝐿(?̂?)Ω𝐻−𝐹𝐻(?̂?)Ω𝐿)−((𝑧+𝑐)Ω𝐻−𝛼ℎ?̂?
2)(Ω𝐿−Ω𝐻)
(𝑧+𝑐)Ω𝐻
2 −
(1−𝛽)(∫ 𝑦𝑓𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0 )
𝛽
.   
b) Social welfare always decreases when the welfare loss of a patient with recurrence who only 
received basic treatment (ℎ) increases. 
One might expect that, due to a more restrictive participation constraint and the resulting 
overtreatment of patients, social welfare cannot increase when the provider is more concerned 
about his reputation and his patients’ health. However, Proposition 2.a formally states that this 
intuition does not always hold. In particular, when the provider does not treat low-risk patients 
with advanced treatment but uses the test for high-risk patients (Case 4), social welfare might 
increase as reputational concern and altruistic behaviour of the provider increases. This result 
arises because when 𝛼 increases, the provider treating high-risk patients, in order to decrease his 
risk exposure, would use advanced treatment with higher probability (i.e., 𝜏𝐻
∗  increases), which 
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causes a decrease in the difference in the payments between low-risk and high-risk patient types. 
This allows the payer to design a contract such that the surplus utility for the provider treating 
low-risk patients to be smaller, resulting in an increase in the payer’s objective function 
(maximizing social welfare). Note that, this is only true when the expected recurrence probability 
of low-risk patients is sufficiently small that it results in a higher surplus utility for the provider 
when treating low-risk patients. The higher the surplus utility of the provider, the higher the 
potential gain for social welfare. Another interpretation for this finding that the social welfare 
might increase as 𝛼 increases could be that when 𝛼 is large, the provider becomes completely 
altruistic or has sufficiently high reputational concerns that there is reduced need to incentivize 
the provider through the reimbursement mechanism. Proposition 2.a is illustrated in Figure 6 
using parameters listed in Table 1. 
Proposition 2.b shows that we cannot observe the same impact on social welfare when 
the welfare loss of a patient with recurrence who only received basic treatment (ℎ) increases. 
This is because an increase in the welfare loss of a patient has a direct negative impact on social 
welfare and cannot be compensated for by reducing the surplus utility of the provider. 
Figure 6: Social welfare as a function of 𝛼 multiplier in Case 4 
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Lastly, the impact of changes in advanced treatment’s adverse events 𝑧, cost 𝑐 and hazard 
ratio 𝑘 are intuitive and formally stated in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: All else equal, the payer is always worse off as the advanced treatment becomes 
less desirable (i.e., increase in 𝑧, 𝑐, or 𝑘), and this effect of treatment characteristics on the 
social welfare is always larger when the treatment threshold is relatively small. 
6. Compulsory Testing 
There is a wide diversity in guidelines and recommendations for new diagnostic tests. In 
addition, many major guidelines are only updated every few years meaning that guidelines may 
lag technical developments. For instance, the 21-gene assay test for breast cancer is 
recommended by the American Society of Clinical Oncology and the U.S. National 
Comprehensive Cancer Network guidelines to be part of the routine practice for early stage 
breast cancer patients but not required as part of treatment (Ragaz 2010). Some other tests, such 
as “Tissue of Origin” test for cancer of unknown primary, are currently not recognized by any 
guidelines and the use of these tests depends on the physician’s decision. Other tests are 
compulsory; for example, KRAS test must be performed before treatment with cetuximab or 
panitimuab for colorectal cancer in Ontario.  
In this section, we assume that the payer might make the use of diagnostic tests 
compulsory and implement a mechanism to verify test results before reimbursing treatment. We 
assume that in making the test compulsory the payer incurs a verification cost 𝐶𝑉 to gather and/or 
interpret the results – otherwise there would still be a problem with asymmetric information. 
The payer’s problem when the test is compulsory is as follows: 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜻
𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚 = 𝑣(𝜻, 1, 𝜏) − 𝐶𝑉                 (12) 
           s.t  𝜏∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
0≤𝜏≤1
𝑔(1, 𝜏)          (𝑂𝑇𝐶) 
        𝑔(1, 𝜏∗) ≥ 0                (𝐼𝑅) 
Program (12) is the modified version of the program (5) in the main model. The main 
difference is that there is no adverse selection because the payer acquires patient information and 
the test is used for all patients regardless of patients’ risk profile. However, we assume that there 
is still moral hazard because the payer cannot impose a treatment choice, as recommended by the 
test result, to the provider. Since the test is compulsory the provider always orders the test (i.e.,  
𝑥 = 1). Lemma 3 presents the region in which the payer can improve social welfare by making 
the test compulsory. 
Lemma 3: Define ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑚 =
𝑧+𝑐
?̂?
{(1 − 𝛽) (∫ 𝐹𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
+ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 [0, 𝐸[𝑟𝐻] − ?̂? +
𝛽
1−𝛽
?̂?
𝑧+𝑐
𝛤(1)]) +
𝛽 (∫ 𝐹𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
+ 𝐸[𝑟𝐿] − ?̂?)}. Then, {𝑉
𝑐𝑜𝑚 > 𝑉|𝐶𝑉 = 0} if and only if:  
 𝐵 ≤
𝑧+𝑐
?̂?
∫ 𝐹𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
 and ?̂? ≤ (∫ F𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
+ ∫ F𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
) (2 ∫ 𝑓𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
− 1)⁄ ; Or 
 𝐵 ≤ ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑚 and ?̂? > (∫ F𝐻(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
+ ∫ F𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
) (2 ∫ 𝑓𝐿(𝑦) ⅆ𝑦
?̂?
0
− 1)⁄  
Proposition 4: It is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory even if 
such a policy can be implemented for free (i.e., 𝐶𝑉 = 0). 
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Figure 7: Compulsory test versus Optional test when 𝐶𝑉 = 0 
 
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 7. The shaded area in Figure 7 is the region where 
social welfare is higher when the test is compulsory. To make it easier to compare with the 
original case where the test is optional, we have superimposed the shaded area on top of the 
graph from Figure 3 using the same scale on the y-axis. Figure 7 shows that while making the 
diagnostic test compulsory removes the adverse selection, even if the payer can implement this 
policy for free (i.e., 𝐶𝑉 = 0) it is not always optimal to do so. This is because the test result does 
not have much value for patients whose expected recurrence probability is higher than the 
optimal treatment threshold (?̂?). Thus when ?̂? is small, if the test is used for all patients, the payer 
pays for a test that might only change the treatment choice for a small group of patients. 
However, the compulsory testing policy becomes more effective when the optimal treatment 
threshold is relatively large, such that there is a higher probability for patients to have recurrence 
score below the treatment threshold and thus a diagnostic test is needed to eliminate unnecessary 
use of advanced treatment for low-risk patients. 
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Corollary 5: There exists an upper bound for the test cost such that if 𝐵 > ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑚|?̂?=?̂?𝐻 it is never 
optimal to make the test compulsory. 
Corollary 5 formally shows the maximum test cost beyond which it is never optimal to make the 
test compulsory. However, as the verification cost for implementation of the policy increases, the 
shaded region in Figure 7 will shift down and compulsory testing will be optimal in a smaller 
region. Therefore, we can argue that while the maximum verification cost that justifies the 
compulsory testing depends on the test cost (𝐵), this threshold cannot be larger than the 
maximum test cost that makes the compulsory test optimal when 𝐶𝑉 = 0 (Lemma 3). 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we examined the optimal design of contracts between a payer and a provider when 
an optional diagnostic test can be used to predict the benefits of an advanced treatment option. 
Following the general framework of the OCM, the contracts include reward payments based on 
the health of patients at the end of a review period. The provider has private information about 
patients’ characteristics (adverse selection), and about whether or not the optimal course of 
action is used (moral hazard).  
Our research provides an argument for the necessity of developing alternative payment 
models. Currently, performance-based payment models consider only the health outcome of a 
patient as the performance measure. However, we show that the payer can improve social 
welfare by incorporating the treatment choice of the provider in the payment contract. This 
payment structure can be easily adopted to the current performance-based payment models by 
including payments for stable health of patients that are not treated with an advanced treatment 
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option. Our findings also highlight the potential impact of tort reform on social welfare, as well 
as highlighting the situations where a compulsory testing policy would be beneficial. 
Similar to other studies in healthcare operations management (e.g., Jiang et al. 2012, 
Chick et al. 2016), we find an optimal menu of contracts assuming ex-ante hidden information. 
However, despite strong theoretical arguments favoring this type of contract, many contracts are 
simple and menus of contracts are rarely observed in practice (Gottlieb and Moreira 2015). One 
reason for this could be that creating incentives through a menu of contracts requires incentives 
based on the agent’s priorities and goals, which may change over time (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). 
Thus, payers may look to methods other than optimal contract design to improve outcomes and 
reduce problems associated with adverse selection, such as more detail in their databases and 
enhanced information flow.  
However, this paper is based on a stylized mathematical model with several limiting 
assumptions. While it is common to only study two types in systems with adverse selection (e.g., 
Yaesoubi and Roberts 2011, Çakanyıldırım et al. 2012, Xiao and Xu 2012, Saghafian and Chao 
2014, Yan et al. 2015) the analysis for multiple types can be derived using similar methodology 
(see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In this case, there will be multiple perceived risk 
distributions for patients (i.e., 𝐹𝑛(𝑟) < 𝐹𝑛−1(𝑟) < ⋯  < 𝐹1(𝑟) where 𝐹1(𝑟) is the distribution for 
the patients with the lowest risk and 𝐹𝑛(𝑟) is the distribution for the patients with the highest 
risk). The payer will offer a menu of contracts to the provider by considering the provider’s 
incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality constraints. The provider will receive a zero 
profit from treating patients with highest risk 𝐹𝑛(𝑟), and the provider might have a positive 
surplus for all other patient types (information rent). The challenging part of the derivation is to 
reduce the incentive-compatibility constraints because the provider might have an incentive to 
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misrepresent the patients from higher-risk distributions as patients from lower-risk distributions. 
However, given the structure of our findings, we expect that the main results of our paper (such 
as non-negative contract terms and not using the test for all patient types even if it was free) will 
continue to hold when there are multiple types. Generalization of the underlying problem to 
other testing technologies may require explicit modeling of the sensitivity and specificity of the 
tests. We assumed that there is only one provider with a fixed number of visiting patients. If 
patients have multiple options when deciding on which provider to visit, then a fruitful avenue of 
future research would be to consider competition among multiple providers. This scenario could 
be modelled as a dynamic principal-agent model, where the provider’s reputation can affect the 
number of visiting patients in the future. 
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